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CLIENT COUNSELING, MEDIATION, AND
ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVES OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ROBERT RUBINSON*

This article examines how litigation and mediation have distinct
narrative structures and what these narratives say about counseling
clients about mediation. In the narrative of litigation, parties struggle
against one another in order to convince a decision maker of the truth
of "what happened." This struggle is about more than designating
liability; it is about enabling the decision-maker to restore social order and vindicate morality. In contrast, the narrative of mediation
does not call upon the mediator to designate "truth" or "right" and
"wrong." Rather, the mediator acts to enable parties to overcome
and transform conflict through collaboration. In the mediation narrative, parties do not struggle against one another, but all mediation
participants - including the mediator herself - struggle collaboratively to overcome and transform conflict. A challenge for counseling clients about mediation is that the litigation narrative reflects
deeply-held cultural norms about conflict resolution. This article argues that lawyers must confront and dislodge this underlying narrative of litigation in order to engage clients in a meaningful inquiry
about mediation. The article concludes with concrete suggestions-a
"toolkit"-for engaging clients in this kind of narrative reframing of
their disputes.
The wind was flapping a temple flag, and two monks were having an
argument about it. One said the flag was moving, the other that the
wind was moving; and they could come to no agreement on the matter. They argued back and forth. Eno the Patriarch said, "It is not
that the wind is moving; it is not that the flag is moving; it is that
your honorable minds are moving. 1

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the comments of Professors Michele E. Gilman, Alan Kirtley,
Cheri Wyron Levin and Jane C. Murphy, as well as Professors Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Jerome Bruner, and Peggy Cooper Davis and participants in New York University School
of Law's Lawyering Theory Workshop, at which an earlier version of this Article was
presented. The author also expresses gratitude to Randi E. Schwartz for her invaluable
support throughout this project.
1 Platform Sutra, quoted in TIMOTHY FERRIS, COMING OF AGE IN THE MILKY WAY 15
(1988).
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INTRODUCTION

What a dispute is - its relevant facts and plausible resolutions - is
contingent upon whether a dispute will be litigated or mediated. This
notion - an idea that this article will elaborate in detaiF - generates
extraordinary opportunities for lawyers to enrich how they and their
clients approach dispute resolution. This opportunity, however, will
be squandered if lawyers merely recast mediation in adversarial
terms.3 Rather, lawyers need to rethink what they do and how they
do it in light of how mediation creates and resolves disputes in ways
that are utterly alien to the norms of advocacy.
This is no easy task. The core activity that has defined what it
means to be a lawyer in popular imagination for centuries is the tria1. 4
Trials are such a fixture in the cultural and legal landscape that it is
easy to overlook how trials embody a very specific view of the world.
Any trial - criminal, tort, contract - is a contest about which party's
story reflects th~ "truth" about "what happened." Given that two inconsistent truths cannot exist simultaneously,S establishing the "truth"
of one party's story necessarily disproves the "truth" of an adversary's
story. Participants in contests also believe passionately that they are
right and that others are wrong, often to the extent that they are morally right and others are morally wrong. Effective lawyers generate
this passion (whether real or feigned) and seek to win the contest by
convincing a decision-maker not only that a client's story is "true," but
that this story embodies the triumph of right over wrong. 6 Moreover,
2 See infra text accompanying notes 34-110.
3 To a certain extent, such recasting has already occurred in certain forms or "styles"
of mediation. For a discussion of this process, see infra text accompanying notes 65, 11116.
4 Carol Clover, Law and the Order of Popular Culture, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF
CULTURE 97 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998).
5 This assumption is a standard piece of folk wisdom that figures prominently in everyday interpretations of how the world works. MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION: 1M·
PLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE FOR ETHICS 7-8 (1993) (describing an aspect of "The
Moral Law Folk Theory" as "[t]here must be one and only one correct conceptualization
for any situation"). In adjudication, the same notions are usually understood through an
assumption that "truth is a matter of accuracy, a matter of reflecting an objective, external
reality." Milner S. Ball, Wrong Experiment, Wrong Result: An Appreciatively Critical Response to Schwartz, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 565, 569-71 (1983). These ideas are formally embodied in three principles of logic ultimately derived from Aristotle: "the law of
identity," which holds that "A equals A"; "the law of noncontradiction," through which
"no statement can be both true and false"; and "the law of the excluded middle," through
which "any statement is either true or false; thus, A or B, and not A and B." Kaiping Peng
& Richard E. Nisbett, Culture, Dialectics, and Reasoning about Contradiction, 54 AM.
PSYCHOL. 741, 744 (1999).
6 A "contest" also describes other types of discourse that are culturally pervasive:
politics, debates in the academy, morning news shows, talk shows, domestic disputes. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicul-
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while trials are only the culmination of the litigation process and to an
increasing extent rarely happen at all,7 the set of assumptions underlying trial practice inform virtually everything else that advocates do.
Developing, supporting, and proving a story determine how advocates
perform client interviewing, discovery, motion practice, negotiation. s
These ideas are so basic as to approach banality. Their very banality, however, masks how trials are not things of nature but contingent, culturally defined events. The world need not be put together
this way. Indeed, to an increasing extent, the world of dispute resolution is not put together this way. The reason is the rapid growth of
mediation9 - a process built upon profoundly different premises than
litigation.1° While the growth of mediation has spawned an enormous
multiplicity of practices performed under its name,11 many forms of
mediation are not a contest of one party against another, nor presume
that one "story" has an exclusive claim to "truth," nor claim that getting to "what happened" should furnish the basis upon which to resolve disputes. Instead, mediation is pragmatism in action: mediators
facilitate the resolution of differences through strategies that have the
potential to facilitate the resolution of differences. Very often such a
resolution entails the recognition of an adversary's perspective, not its
obliteration as false. 12
This article examines these issues through the lens of narrative
theory. My central thesis is that litigation and mediation each embody
a narrative that shapes, orders, and controls the meaning of the "dispute" at issue. I first explore recent advances in narrative theory and
demonstrate how litigation and mediation entail a process that can be
described narratively and how this process profoundly influences what
tural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 11 (1996).
7 David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Hebert M. Kritzer & Joel B.
Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 U.C.L.A L. REV. 72, 89 (1993) (noting
that trials are "rare" and most cases resolve through settlement); Kent D. Syverud, ADR
and the Decline of the American Civil Jury, 44 U.C.L.A L. REV. 1935 (1997). See also
Hope Viner Sanborn, The Vanishing Trial, 88 AB.A J. 24 (2002).
8 The role of "contest" extends to legal education. The first-year curriculum - the best
gauge there is of the conventional wisdom of what "thinking like a lawyer" means - has
not changed much in 125 years. The operative procedure is that of a contest: majority and
dissenting opinions are contested, students contest the efficacy of different rules, the
teacher contests the understanding of students. See, e.g., Derek Bok, A Flawed System of
Law Practice and Law Teaching, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570,582 (1983) (describing "the familiar tilt in the law curriculum toward preparing students for legal contest").
9 See infra text accompanying notes 52-63.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 72-91.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 57-68. My discussion of mediation adheres to the
traditional conception that has been identified as "facilitative" in recent literature. See
infra text accompanying note 65. Unless noted otherwise, subsequent references to "mediation" refer to this model of mediation practice.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 76-81.
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stories are told within that process. The article then explores the practical application of these ideas when lawyers counsel clients. Given
that a lawyer can generate insights about what a dispute is or can be
by describing different ways that a dispute can be resolved, the narratives of litigation and mediation enable clients to better understand
that litigation is a choice, and not always the most prudent choice, in
resolving disputes.
By comparing narratives in litigation and mediation in this manner, I am not suggesting that lawyers should view mediation as superior to litigation in some essentialist sense. This is far too reductive,
and many students of conflict resolution going back to Lon Fuller
have rejected such an all or nothing approach.13 Moreover, in some
instances mediation can be not only inappropriate, but affirmatively
damaging. 14 Rather, my approach -like those of others - draws upon
what is probably the central insight of American pragmatism: "ideas
. . . are tools - like forks and knives and microchips - that people
devise to cope with the world in which they find themselves."15 For
my purposes, the knives and forks and microchips are processes to
resolve controversy. The "people" doing the devising are the attorney
and client collaborating through counseling. The challenge as I see it,
then, is not merely to educate law students 16 and practitioners 17 about
mediation or to create an ethical obligation to counsel clients about
alternative forms of dispute resolution,18 but, rather, to examine the
13 For an excellent summary of how the intellectual originators of ADR theory - including Fuller, Soia Mentschikoff, and the legal process theorists Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks - approached these questions, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of
Invention: The Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2000).
14 See infra text accompanying notes 121-22.
15 LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB xi (2001). In the context of dispute resolution theory, this idea is also often called "fitting the forum to the fuss." MenkelMeadow, supra note 13, at 25.
16 Terri Durrett & Marc Tittlebaum, Report of the Working Group on the Proposed
Ethical Duty to Recommend Alternative Dispute Resolution, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 65, 68
(1999); Lea B. Vaughn, Integrating Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) into the Curriculum at the University of Washington School of Law: A Report and Reflections, 50 FLA. L.
REV. 679 (1998).
17 Suzanne J. Schmitz, Giving Meaning to the Second Generation of ADR Education:
Attorneys'Duty To Learn About ADR and What They Must Learn, 1999 J. DISP. RESOL.
29.
18 Some commentators have argued that ethics rules should mandate attorneys to advise clients of the availability of ADR. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, ADR, the ABA, and
Client Control: A Proposal that the Model Rules Require Lawyers to Present ADR Options
to Clients, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 183 (1999); Carol VanAuken-Haight & Pamela Chapman
Einslen, Attorney Duty to Inform Clients of ADR?, 72 MICH. B.J. 1038 (1993). New language adopted as one of the "Ethics 2000" amendments to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct move in this direction. MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cm!. (2002)
("when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it may be necessary ... to inform the client of
forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation").
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nuts and bolts of how to counsel clients about choices for dispute resolution - the tools for describing the tools.
With this challenge in mind, the article concludes by proposing
strategies for how lawyers can and should counsel clients about mediation. By embracing narrative possibilities in constructing disputes,
such "mediation-talk" generates opportunities for lawyers to enrich a
client's sense of what a dispute is or could be which, in turn, empowers
clients to make informed choices about which dispute resolution process can best promote client values and goals.
II.

THE GUIDE FOR THE INVESTIGATION: NARRATIVE THEORY

This Section will summarize the role that ideas about narrative
have played in legal theory and current thinking about how narrative
relates to cognition. It goes on to describe what a narrative is - a
definition that will form the basis for my succeeding analysis of the
narratives of Litigation and Mediation.

A.

The Uses of Narrative

Much has been written and debated about the usefulness of ideas
about narrative to understanding judging and lawyering,19 and, very
recently, to how mediators can mediate effectively as welPo Without
entering into the details of these debates, narrative theory, at a minimum, can powerfully describe adjudication and dispute resolution
generally. Scholars have used narrative to explain how judges and juries determine "the facts of the case,"21 how lawyers persuade decision-makers of the merits of their clients' cause,22 and how judges
Some have also argued that the failure to advise clients about alternatives to litigation
should constitute legal malpractice. Robert F. Cochran, Legal Representation and the Next
Steps Toward Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to
Control Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819
(1990).
19 A particularly influential and important work on narrative and the law is Robert
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1983). The extension of narrative as a method of legal scholarship has attracted
particular attention. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School:
An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
20 See JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW Ap·
PROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2001). While providing valuable insights into media·
tion techniques through the lens of stories disputants tell in mediation, this work neither
addresses attorney-client counseling nor mediation and litigation narratives at the definitionallevel that is the focus of this article. See infra text accompanying notes 33-110.
21 See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991).
22 Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681
(1994); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Thurgood Marshall's Image of the Blue-Eyed Child in
Brown, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 226 (1993).
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construct persuasive opinions. 23
Among the many insights developed in this literature is how misleading it is to conceive of legal analysis strictly in terms of logic and
rationality.24 To take one example, the judicial system tends to assume that jurors - chosen with an eye to having an "open mind" assess the weight and credibility of individual pieces of testimonial
and physical evidence at trial. This process ultimately produces (so
the assumption goes) "findings of fact" driven by evidence and untainted by the outside world. However, as the theoretical and empirical work of Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie demonstrate, "jurors
impose a narrative story organization on trial information."25 Pennington and Hastie make two critical points: 1) jurors interpret evidence in the context of stories they construct, and 2) these stories are
the products of "experience and beliefs in the social world" that exist
independently of what happens at trial.2 6 Lest this conclusion be dismissed as merely confirming the oft-maligned "irrationality" of how
jurors decide cases, scholars have persuasively shown how judges including judges of the United States Supreme Court - reach decisions
in exactly the same wayP
The underlying message here is not that jurors and judges are
doing their work badly; the message is that this is the only way that
jurors and judges can do their work at all. To make the point more
explicitly, "stories are not just recipes for stringing together a set of
'hard facts'" but rather "stories construct the facts that comprise
them."28 What Pennington and Hastie argue that jurors do is what we
all do.2 9
23 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 143-164 (2000).
While ostensibly drawing upon pure reason - or at least the subspecies of pure reason
called "legal reasoning" - the persuasive power of judicial opinions can be viewed as arising from their subtle evocation of mythic stock stories and rhetorical devices that carry
within them embedded cultural norms. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, The Proverbial
Woman, 48 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 7 (1993).
24 See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon between Legal
Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2228 (1989) ("[t]he attraction of
narrative is that it corresponds more closely to the manner in which the human mind
makes sense of experience than does the conventional, abstracted rhetoric of law"). This
use of narrative is part of a larger, ongoing assault on the legitimacy of standard legal
analysis - an assault that is both traced in and exemplified by PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998).
.
25 See, e.g., Pennington & Hastie, supra note 21, at 521.
26 Id. at 525.
27 See generally Amsterdam, supra note 22; AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23;
Davis, supra note 23.
28 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 111 (emphasis in original). See also Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 4 (1991).
29 Indeed, to a perhaps surprising degree, the process of narrative construction begins
even when children are just beginning to acquire language skills. See NARRATIVES FROM
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While the purposes and origins of narrative are unsettled and
complex questions, one function of narrative is particularly significant
for purposes of this article. Narrative is a primary mechanism through
which we explain breaches, violations, or deviations from a norm. 30
Such events are tales told by storytellers (that is, all of us) every day:
difficulties at work or at home, newspaper or magazine "stories,"
things that go awry in life or things that go especially well. Going to
the grocery store and buying what you need is not a story; going to the
grocery store and getting into an argument about a price, or waiting
on the checkout line for two hours, or witnessing the arrest of a shoplifter, or forgetting to bring an umbrella in a downpour, or getting a
spectacularly good buy on an item, are stories potentially worth telling. All involve experiences that deviate however modestly from the
usual and the expected. 31 Of course, stories may be far more than
anecdotes about shopping. Stories can and do tell of national or religious origins or strivings, or of history, or of the arc of one's own life. 32
B.

The "Austere Definition" of Narrative

If humans employ stories to describe experience and "reality"
and stories, in turn, constitute experience and "reality," narrative
structure becomes a question well worth investigating. While defining
the universal attributes of narrative is far from settled (assuming, of
course, that it can ever be truly settled), I will adopt what Anthony
Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner have called the "Austere Definition"
of narrative. The Austere Definition embodies what is largely uncontroversial in current thinking on narrative. While some would argue
that narrative is more than this, it is difficult to argue that it is less.
Here is the Austere Definition:
A narrative ... needs a cast of human-like characters, beings capable of willing their own actions, forming intentions, holding beliefs,
having feelings. It also needs a plot with a beginning, a middle, and
an end, in which particular characters are involved in particular
events. The unfolding of the plot requires (implicitly or explicitly):
(1) an initial steady state grounded in the legitimate ordinariness of
THE CRIB (Katherine Nelson ed., 1989); JUDY DUNN, THE BEGINNINGS OF SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING (1988).
30 Bruner, supra note 28, at 11.
31 Jerome Bruner has characterized this aspect of narrative as embodying "canonicity
and breach": "to be worth telling, a tale must be about how an implicit canonical script has
been breached, violated, or deviated from in a manner to do violence to ... the 'legitimacy'
of the canonical script." Bruner, supra note 28, at 11.
32 See Louis O. Mink, Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument, in THE WRITING OF
HISTORY: LITERARY FORM AND HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 129-149 (Robert H. Canary & Henry Kozicki, eds. 1978); Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, 7 CRITICAL INQUIRY 5 (1980).
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things
(2) that gets disrupted by a Trouble consisting of circumstances attributable to human agency or susceptible to change by human
intervention,
(3) in turn evoking efforts at redress or transformation, which succeed or fail,
(4) so that the old steady state is restored or a new (transformed)
steady state is created,
(5) and the story concludes by drawing the then-and-there of the
tale that has been told into the here-and-now of the telling through
some coda - say, for example, Aesop's characteristic moral of the
story.33

While austere, among the fascinating dimensions of this definition is that it contains several disjunctive "or" statements. These include Trouble "attributable to human agency or susceptible to change
by human intervention," Efforts at "redress or transformation," and a
steady state that is ultimately either "restored" or "transformed."
More on these crucial forks in the road shortly.
With these basic insights of narrative theory in mind, we can now
turn to the contexts of litigation and mediation to help build a fresh
view of the meaning of conflict and conflict resolution.

III.

THE STORY OF LITIGATION

So what is the Story of Litigation? One way of approaching this
question is to conceive of litigation as itself a mechanism for story
completion. Each litigant arrives with an unfinished, inconsistent
story, and the job of a judge or jury is to finish telling the story the
"right" way. The mechanics of this process, however, only hint at the
type of story parties seek to prove in litigation. At this level, participants in litigation draw from a deeper or "meta-narrative" about each
party's struggle to vindicate good over evil.
A.

The Stories of Litigation

Let's start as narrative itself starts, with the Steady State and the
Trouble that upsets the Steady State: The world is in order. People
are acting towards each other as they should, or at least no one is
straying too far from the norm. And then ... something happens.
One party34 claims that another party did something to generate disorder, to make the world out of joint. In other words, Trouble dis& BRUNER, supra note 23, at 113-14 (emphasis in original).
For purposes of clarity, I will assume a two party dispute in this discussion. Needless
to say, litigation often involves multiple parties as co-defendants, co-plaintiffs, or parties in
third-party practice. Such additional parties may generate additional narratives as against
individual parties.
33 AMSTERDAM
34
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rupts the Steady State. In a breach of contract case, the parties enter
into a contract (Steady State) and then one party breaches the contract
(TroubLe). In a tort case, plaintiff is walking on the sidewalk (Steady
State) and then slips and falls (TroubLe), or plaintiff is having a beer
(Steady State) and then defendant slugs plaintiff (TroubLe). In a criminal case, a bank is doing what banks ordinarily do (Steady State) and
then is held up by a defendant armed with a gun (TroubLe). The defendant claims either that: 1) nothing happened, and an attempt to
demonstrate otherwise is itself an example of disorder and thus of
TroubLe, and/or 2) something did happen to generate disorder, but it
was the other party that did it.
So who is right and who is wrong, or, to put it in terms of the
Austere Definition, who is the real source of TroubLe? The assumption that one party is right and one party is wrong is not open to question; litigation is based on a shared norm among all participants
(litigants, judge, jury) that only one of the litigants is right about
"what happened." Since there is only one true source of TroubLe, parties expend Efforts to demonstrate to the finder of fact that their story
is the "right" one. 35 These Efforts are subsumed within the procedures of litigation itself. Parties are successful in their Efforts to the
extent the judge (or jury) decides that the origins of TroubLe are as a
party claims. Thus, the end result of successful Efforts is that a judge
or jury Restores the Steady State by granting relief to the party whose
version of TroubLe is the right one.
To recapitulate, parties first come to litigation with divergent versions of TroubLe. The court's job is to finish the story the "right" way
so that a party's story makes sense. A bare bones representation of
this narrative scheme would be as follows:
Joe's Story
Steady State [already happened]: Dave and I were talking.
Trouble [already happened]: Dave punched me.
Efforts [is happening]: I am showing and will show that Dave owes
me money for my injuries.
Restoration of Steady State [should happen]: Dave pays me money.
Coda [should happen]: Justice is done.
Dave's Story
Steady State [already happened]: Joe and I were talking.
Trouble [already happened]: Joe swung his arm to punch me. As a
35 A leading text on trial advocacy describes developing a theory of the case as an
"ongoing process of developing logical, consistent positions on disputed facts and integrating them harmoniously with the undisputed facts to create a persuasive story of what really
happened." THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 508 (6th ed. 2002).
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reflex, I hit him.
Efforts [is happening): I am showing and will show that this case
must be dismissed.
Restoration of Steady State [should happen): This case is dismissed.
Coda [should happen]: Justice is done.

Once the litigation is concluded, the "true" plot of the story can now
be told completely and definitively. Either Joe's right, or Dave's right,
or some combination thereof is right. Such a story - its fuzziness and
indeterminacy stripped away - is familiar to every first-year law student, for this is almost invariably the narrative told in judicial
opinions: 36
Steady State: Facts of Case.
Trouble: Facts of Case.
Efforts: Procedural History.
Restoration/Transformation of Steady State: Decision of court/entry
of judgment.
Coda: Justice is done. 37

Even this brief tour highlights an important dimension of litigation. The engine that drives litigation is a kind of anxiety about story
completion. "Facts" need to be "found." The goal of an advocate is
to persuade the decision-maker that the advocate's story is the right
one, and if the advocate's story is the right one, then the "ending" that is, the Restoration or Transformation of the Steady State - flows
from it. 38 In this sense, the Efforts are a contest about who caused the
Trouble, and "finding" who did determines what the proper Restoration should be. For example, a plaintiff in a tort case seeks to convince the decision-maker that the Trouble was due to defendant's
negligence. If it is, the rest of the story must be a judgment by the
judge or jury in favor of plaintiff in order to return plaintiff to the
Steady State before the Trouble began. End of story. Another ending
- entry of judgment in favor of the defendant - would feel hollow and
wrong in light of this decision-maker's understanding of the Steady
36 I have argued elsewhere that this retelling necessarily distorts the narrative indeterminacy that is the hallmark of contested litigation prior to the rendering of a judicial decision. Robert Rubinson, The Polyphonic Courtroom: Expanding the Possibilities of Judicial
Discourse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 3,4 (1996).
37 The final component - the Coda - reaffirms the power of law to restore the moral
and, by extension, social order. While on occasion explicitly referred to in judicial opinions, the Coda is most frequently implied.
38 This point recalls Ronald Dworkin's notion that lines of precedent constitute a continuing story. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-32 (1986). My concern, however, is
not with appellate or even judicial decision-making per se, but with how the narrative of
litigation influences the resolution of conflict.
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State and Trouble. Unless, of course, you view the Trouble as not being caused by defendant's negligence and the Trouble as the commencement of meritless litigation by the Plaintiff: in that case, entry of
judgment in favor of the defendant would seem to be the natural
ending. 39
B.

The Story of Litigation as Morality Tale

The competing stories at issue in litigation tend to have common
elements. Recall the disjunctive elements in the Austere Definition. 40
The first disjunctive element relates to the nature of the Trouble - that
it consists "of circumstances attributable to human agency or susceptible to change by human intervention." In litigation, the crux of virtually all claims is that the Trouble for which redress is sought must be
attributable to a human agent. 41 Otherwise the whole point of litigation - in civil cases, the ordering of one or more parties to do or give
something for the benefit of one or more parties, or, in criminal cases,
the imposition of a penalty - would be meaningless.
Moreover, and this is critical, the premise of a claim in litigation
is that circumstances are virtually always attributable to a morally corrupted human agency. Acts that constitute contested facts in litigation
- commission of an intentional or unintentional tort, violation of a
statute with corresponding civil or criminal penalties, breaching a contract - are almost invariably framed as moral failings. 42 Things do not
39 It has been noted that sensitivity to this aspect of narrative - its ability to foreclose
the possibility of alternative endings - is the hallmark of effective advocacy. See Sara
Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Neutrality as a Discursive Practice: The Construction and Transformation of Narratives in Community Mediation, 11 STUD. L. POL. & Soc. 69, 72 (1991);
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 133.
40 See supra text accompanying note 33.
41 The exceptions - no fault divorce, no fault automobile insurance - are remarkable in
that they are so few and their adoption was enormously difficult and controversial because
they are so discordant with the "story" I am describing. See, e.g., PHILIP B. HEYMANN &
LANCE LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 309-335
(1988) (describing the legislative hurdles facing proponents of no fault automobile
insurance ).
42 Empirical evidence also suggests that litigants themselves associate litigation - as
opposed to more informal means of dispute resolution - in moral terms. See Sally Engle
Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want?: Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9
JUST. Sys. J. 151, 172 (1984) (in conducting an ethnographic study of three small American
neighborhoods, authors found that when "[w]hen people do bring interpersonal disputes to
court, they tend to be ... problems in which the moral values at stake appear sufficiently
important to outweigh the condemnation" associated with commencing litigation). It is
interesting to note that there are powerful public policy reasons to avoid this explicitly
"moral" discourse in divorce, Worker's Compensation, and automobile accident litigation the rare areas of law that are explicitly "no fault." See, e.g., HEYMANN & LIEBMAN, supra
note 41, at 310-312 (1988) (discussing the expense, volume, and imprecision of personal
injury cases involving automobiles and the trend towards "no-fault" cases); Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in
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happen situationally, or circumstantially, or because of divergent perspectives and experiences on seemingly "identical" events. 43
This moral dimension ups the ante of the rest of the story. The
Efforts at redress now take on the gravity of a moral crusade, with the
court (judge, jury or both) cast as the hero empowered to restore
moral order to the world. As a result, the Restoration of the Steady
State takes on the seriousness of righting a moral universe that is out
of joint due to the immoral acts of another party. And, of course, it is
almost inevitable that a party defending against a claim of moral culpability will fight back in kind by labeling the other party as a morally
culpable agent who is asserting a meritless claim, or, in a standard
strategy in civil litigation, has engaged in independently wrongful acts
that are set forth in counterclaims. 44 The decision-maker, now an actor in the drama, must vindicate goodness by identifying and rewarding the "good" party and condemning and punishing the "bad"
party.45 Each side struggles to generate intense emotional responses
Family Law, 60 UNIV. Prrr. L. REV. 1111, 1154 (1999) (describing how divorce in the "fault
era" involved rampant "collusion and perjury"). Of course, even these areas are, in many
respects, hardly purely "no fault." HEYMANN & LIEBMAN, supra note 41, at 313; Murphy,
supra note 41, at 1154-1203 (describing the "new moral discourse" of family law).
43 A powerful psychological force - usually called the "prime" or "fundamental attribution error" - is also at work here. This tendency encourages people "to attribute their own
actions to situational factors ... and the actions of others to stable personality traits." Paul
Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV. 526, 548
(1994); Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings, in 10 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 174, 184 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977). See also
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 39 ("[hJumans seem to find it easy and natural
to categorize people's actions as intentional; they have much more difficulty seeing people's behaviors as, say, circumstantially or structurally determined"). What makes this "error" particularly troubling is social science research demonstrating that traits associated
with good morals - such as honesty - are acutely sensitive to context. For example, in a
pioneering series of studies, Hugh Hartshorne and M.A. May found that while many
schoolchildren cheat on school exams when given the opportunity to do so, there was not a
group of "cheaters" who consistently cheated; rather, some students cheated under certain
circumstances (for example, depending on what was being tested or where the test was
administered) while others cheated under other circumstances. Hugh Hartshorne & Mark
May, Studies in the Organization o/Character, READINGS IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 190 (H.
Munisinger ed., 1971).
44 See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . .. , 15 L. & Soc. REV. 631, 641
(1980-1981) ("litigation . . . may intensify the disputant's moral judgment and focus
blame"). Criminal practice contains its own version of fighting morality with morality:
while the essence of prosecution (and of the criminal law generally) is invariably that the
accused is immoral, a standard defense is that prosecutors and/or law enforcement are
corrupt, engaging in a cover-up, incompetent, overreaching, etc. My point here is not
whether such stories are true or not, but that the adversarial system by its nature generates
this mode of discourse.
45 Such a contest reflects deeply held cultural norms that create a binary universe: there
is "us" - the good - and "the other" - the bad, with the distinction being framed in religious or moral terms. Such a story "draws the battle lines between 'the sons of light' and
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on the part of our decision-maker/hero so that the hero will do the
right thing: empathy for the victim and outrage, anger, resentment at
the moral failings of the wrongdoer. 46
Given these qualities, the story of litigation assumes the fervor of
a religious crusade. The "zealousness" so often extolled in litigation
tends to create a binary moral universe in which one's client has moral
integrity and the opposing party does not. Indeed, it is no accident
that the word "zealous" itself arose in a religious context.47 Interestingly, the judge - the presiding authority empowered to vindicate morality - in many ways acts as a kind of divinity, or at least a
representative of a divine-like higher power, meting out judgments in
accordance with a moral ledger. There is linguistic evidence for this particularly the "prayer for relief" that concludes a complaint in civil
litigation - but it also manifests itself physically: the priest-like robes
worn by judges, the elevated bench set off from the earthly world below. There is also something otherworldly in the studied detachment
that is the conventional sine qua non of effective judging.48
Finally, the vindications of morality issued by judges - and the
stories they tell about them - reflect the moral foundation of law. In
Amsterdam and Bruner's phrase, stories in adjudication "relate the
Grand and Timeless Principles of a corpus juris to the current particularities of ... cases."49 In other words, stories in litigation carry far
more freight than just sorting parties into good and bad; their telling
reaffirms and instantiates "law" in concrete particulars, thereby vindicating the culturally defined norms represented by "law." Indeed, the
very grandness and timelessness of "law" means that it can only manifest itself in particulars. 50 These stories are thus the only way we have
the 'sons of darkness.'" AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 83-84, quoting ELAINE
PAGELS, THE ORIGIN OF SATAN 105 (1995).
46 An interesting tension exists in this aspect of Efforts in litigation. It should come as
no surprise that "[t]he experiences that lead people to litigate are often highly emotional."
Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and
Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL.
269,303 (1999). While clients may be frustrated at their inability to "vent" these emotions,
effective advocacy often involves eliciting such emotions on the part of the decision-maker.
At the same time, it is at the core of our conception of "law" that it has nothing to do with
emotion, and everything to do with the rational application of legal principles to facts. This
disconnect raises important inconsistencies between how adjudication actually works usually through a carefully calibrated appeal to emotion - and how we say it should work a "blind," rational application of facts to law.
47 See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICfIONARY 1370 (1988) (the "zealots"
were "a fanatical sect arising in Judea during the first century A.D."). The word retains its
religious overtones through the phrase a "religious zealot."
48 Rubinson, supra note 36, at 31.
49 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 141.
50 This notion plays out in many standard principles of adjudication and jurisprudence,
from the requirement that jurisdiction be limited to an actual "case" or "controversy" (see
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to get at what "law" is - a process that strongly evokes the descriptions of divine happenings on earth so central to religious scripture.
Litigation therefore presupposes that a corrupted moral agent
has disrupted an ordered, moral universe. The decision-maker/hero
must intervene to right these wrongs. Such a meta-narrative profoundly influences the stories told in litigation. It determines where a
story begins and ends, identifies which facts are relevant in a general
and evidentiary sense, suggests what remedies are appropriate or inappropriate, and generates particular emotional responses on the part
of the parties and on the part of decision-makers.
In the end, litigation is about who is good and who is not and
what to do about it. This moral vision is the foundation of what a case
is in litigation.
IV.

THE STORY OF MEDIATION

The story of litigation has been so thoroughly internalized by litigants, judges, and lawyers alike that it operates below the level of consciousness. That is why it has not been necessary to describe what
litigation is; everybody - lawyers and non-lawyers alike - knows what
it is. The purpose of the preceding discussion, therefore, was to examine a process that is usually taken for granted in an unfamiliar way
- an attempt to, in other words, make the familiar strange. 51
In contrast, for a culture steeped in litigation, the risk in approaching mediation is in underestimating its strangeness. In its more
sophisticated forms, mediation is bizarre indeed: it proceeds from fundamentally different premises as to what resolving disputes is about
and, even more fundamentally, as to what a dispute is. Or, to put it in
terms of my analysis thus far, it tells a different story.
Before getting to this story, however, mediation's relative unfamiliarity warrants some discussion of what it is and the contexts in
which it is practiced.
A.

The Basics of Mediation

The very success of mediation has spawned a growing diversity of
proceedings that carry that label. This is an interesting trend in and of
itself. Given how the adversary system often acts, as Carrie MenkelMeadow has put it, "like a great whale" that "seems to swallow up any
Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case" or "Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979)) to the unfolding of the "common law"
through the adjudication of specific cases.
51 The significance of "making the familiar strange" is an important theme in AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 4, and a goal to which I will return in discussing counseling clients about mediation. See infra text accompanying notes 143-69.
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effort to modify or transform it, "52 "Mediation" is sometimes seen as
a subspecies of litigation - glorified settlement conferences in which a
"mediator" will advise parties what a case is "worth" or what a "fair"
resolution would be. 53 Moreover, legislation has attempted to "mandate" mediation54 or empower a mediator to "recommend" a proper
resolution to a judge,55 both of which are fundamentally inconsistent
with the essence of mediation. 56 Depending on the particulars (and
this is no modest caveat - particulars can indeed be crucial), such
forms can blend into - or at least towards - a more adversarial
process.
Moreover, mediation is practiced in a dizzying variety of controversies - divorce, disputes between or within business organizations,57
community disputes,58 disputes concerning the environment,59 conflicts between students at schools,60 criminal matters (usually called
"victim-offender mediation"),61 international disputes,62 virtually any
52 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 40 (1996).
53 See infra text accompanying note 65.
54 See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 1991 YALE
L. J. 1545, 1547 (1991) (collecting authorities). Some have argued that these provisions are
advisable and consistent with the principles of mediation so long as they mandate only the
process of mediation, not a particular result, while others argue that "mandated mediation" is an oxymoron in that a foundation of mediation is that it be a voluntary process. Id.
at 1581-1585. For a discussion of the voluntariness of mediation, see infra text accompanying notes 72-75.
55 A primary example is California, which enables local jurisdictions to permit
mediators to "submit a recommendation to the court as to the custody of or visitation with
a child." CAL. FAM. CODE § 3183(a). Such provisions have generated substantial criticism. See Grillo, supra note 54, at 1588.
56 See infra text accompanying notes 82, 92-110.
57 See CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE To CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (1996) (detailing the uses of ADR and mediation for conflicts within
organizations).
58 See, e.g, THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY
MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Sally Engle Merry & Neil Milner eds., 1995); Cobb &
Rifkin, supra note 39.
59 Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT.
L. REV. 1 (1981).
60 William S. Haft & Elaine R. Weiss, Peer Mediation in Schools: Expectations and
Evaluations, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 213 (1998); Kelly Rozmus, Peer Mediation Programs
in Schools: Resolving Classroom Conflict But Raising Ethical Concerns?, 26 J.L. & EDUC.
69 (1997).
61 Mark William Bakker, Repairing the Breach and Reconciling the Discordant: Mediation in the Criminal Justice System, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1994); Jennifer Gerarda Brown,
The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J.
1247 (1994).
62 Judd Epstein, The Use of Comparative Law in Commercial International Arbitration
and Commercial Mediation, 75 TuL. L. REV. 913 (2001).
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dispute that is or could be the subject of a lawsuit63 - that discussions
of mediation often assume that "mediation" happens to have the characteristics of the form of mediation with which the people doing the
discussing are familiar. 64 Scholars themselves are also hardly uniform
in their views: even within the last decade, debates have erupted over
the efficacy of newly categorized "models" of or "approaches" to mediation, such as "facilitative" versus "evaluative" mediation65 and
63 For a review of the preceding and other applications of mediation, see KIMBERLEE
K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 339-357 (2d ed. 2000).
64 For example, the subject matter area that has generated the most debate about the
appropriateness of mediation - family law - is in many respects unique in its aggregation of
intense emotional, political, and social stakes for participants. Other types of frequently
mediated disputes may present a very different set of circumstances, and the resulting mediation can therefore be quite different. Nevertheless, critiques of mediation grounded in
the particular circumstances at play in family law disputes are extended more generally to
mediation as a whole. See generally Grillo, supra note 54.
65 Leonard Riskin first articulated this distinction. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding
Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG.
111 (1994); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996). As its name
implies, "facilitative" mediation focuses exclusively on facilitating communication between
the parties. Facilitative mediators do not independently suggest solutions, offer no assessment of the strength of a parties' positions or "case," and do not predict what will happen
if parties fail to reach a mediated settlement. In contrast, an evaluative mediator may
suggest and argue in favor of certain solutions, may assess the strength of a parties' legal or
non-legal position, and may predict what will happen if parties do not reach a mediated
settlement. It should be noted that the spectrum of control manifested by mediators is
sometimes expressed under different nomenclature in the literature. See, e.g., Edwin H.
Greenebaum, On Teaching Mediation, 1999 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 130 (arguing that
mediators "control the substance and process of parties' negotiations" across a spectrum
"from facilitator, to consultant, to advisor, to guardian"). Moreover, Riskin himself has
recently offered revisions to his enormously influential categories. Leonard L. Riskin,
Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 No·
TRE DAME L. REV. 1, 30 (2003) (proposing the substitution of the terms "directive" and
"elicitive" for "evaluative" and "facilitative").
In any event, categorizing mediators as "facilitative" or "evaluative" has generated
extensive academic debates about which approach is best. See, e.g., Carrie MenkelMeadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute
Professionals, 44 U.c.L.A. L. REV. 1871, 1887 (1997); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 985
(1997). Other commentators argue (in my view accurately) that the distinction has been
overblown and that virtually all mediations likely contain elements of both approaches,
albeit with different degrees of emphasis. See, e.g., Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers,
Non-Lawyers and Mediation: Rethinking the Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 235,276-280 (2002) (arguing that all mediations
contains explicit or implicit "evaluation" by the mediator). That said, an extreme "evaluative approach" does tend to adopt the norms of the adversary system, which, in turn, renders this approach largely if not fully consistent with how the adversary system shapes and
resolves conflict. Not surprisingly, "evaluative mediation" resonates well with conventional modes of lawyering and, as a result, lawyers tend to choose and prefer an evaluative
approach on the part of mediators. J. Brad Reich, Attorney v. Client: Creating a Mechanism to Address Competing Process Interests in Lawyer-Driven Mediation, 26 S. ILL. U.L.J.
183, 188-192 (2002). In contrast, what is called "facilitative mediation" tends to create
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"transformative" versus "transactional" mediation. 66 Moreover, given
the flexibility and openness inherent in the mediation process, the
tone and flavor of mediation is particularly subject to the personality,
skills, philosophy, and sophistication of a particular mediator. Indeed,
depending on the jurisdiction and the type of mediation, a given mediator mayor may not be a lawyer67 or may not even have any specialized training in mediation at al1. 68
Even with this diversity of opinion about mediation,69 there remains a measure of consensus among commentators at least about
what mediation should be, particularly at the narrative level at which I
wish to approach it. A leading mediation text offers a representative
- albeit not a particularly evocative - example:
[M]ediation is generally defined as the intervention in a negotiation
or a conflict of an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power but who assists the involved parties in voluntarily reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of
different narratives and different disputes. To the extent these categories represent meaningful distinctions, my references to mediation assume a "facilitative" approach.
66 See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994). Proponents of "transformative mediation" argue that mediation has classically been concerned
with the resolution of a particular conflict or "transaction." This focus on "settlement" - a
vestige of adjudication - constrains what mediation can achieve. The goal of transformative mediation is both different and more ambitious: instead of focusing on settling a particular dispute, transformative mediation seeks to transform the quality of future
interactions among the parties themselves. Thus, "[s]uccess is measured, in transformative
mediation, not by settlement but by party shifts toward strength, responsiveness and constructive interaction." Robert A. Baruch Bush, Handling Workplace Conflict: Why Transformative Mediation?, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 367, 369-70 (2001). Put another way,
transformative mediation uses specific disputes as a means to engender broader change in
how the parties interact.
67 Nolan-Haley, supra note 65, at 254-56 . As lawyers have become increasingly involved in mediation, the issue of whether mediators need to be lawyers has generated
"[t]ensions between legal and non-legal professionals who practice mediation." Jd. at 256.
68 This diversity of qualifications exists even in the jurisdictions that mandate divorce
mediation. See Craig A. McEwan, Nancy H. Rogers & Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the
Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317,1396-97 (1995) (collecting "mediator qualifications" in "jurisdictions with regulated mandatory mediation"). Nevertheless, the continuing growth of
mediation has led more states to require some measure of certification for mediators. Nolan-Haley, supra note 65, at 244 n.34 (collecting recent efforts to require licensing of
mediators).
69 The same diversity also applies to litigation. Litigation itself is extraordinarily diverse, ranging from a criminal jury trial (a sort of baseline paradigm of "zealous advocacy") to commercial litigation, matters primarily involving poor defendants (iandlordtenant and consumer debt collection matters in particular) that are usually litigated in separate "high volume" fora, administrative proceedings of numerous varieties, etc. This fundamental diversity is only rarely recognized in descriptions of the adversary system. For an
exception, see Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of
Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992).
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issues in dispute. In addition to addressing substantive issues, mediation may also establish or strengthen relationships of trust and respect between parties or terminate relationships in a manner that
minimizes costs and psychological harm'?o

A more succinct definition, found widely in the literature, is that mediation is "facilitated negotiation. "71
Neither definition expresses how radically different mediation
can be from litigation. Rather than attempt some sort of systematic
point by point procedural comparison - a futile exercise given that the
two processes do not have parallel points to compare - I will attempt
to dig deeper by describing six conceptual differences between litigation and mediation.

1.

Actors and Owners

Once litigation is commenced, parties are actors compelled by
force of law to act within a system: this is most obvious in criminal
cases, where criminal defendants obviously cannot unilaterally "opt
out" of a case, but it is also true in civil litigation, where one party can
compel the participation of another party or risk entry of a default
judgment. Moreover, all litigation operates in the shadow of a simple
fact: a court can impose its judgments by force on parties - a force
that Robert Cover famously characterized as a state-sponsored resort
to "violence. "72
In contrast, mediation is a voluntary process.?3 While this picture
has been clouded by the rise of "court-referred" and "court-ordered"
mediation and enforceable "agreements to mediate,"74 a preeminentif not the greatest - value in mediation is "the principle of self-determination"75 through which parties "own" the process. The ultimate
way to "own" a process is to have power to decide whether to engage
70 CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT 15 (2d ed. 1998).
71 See, e.g., KOVACH, supra note 63, at 23.
72 Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986). As Cover put
it, "[Ilegal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death ... A judge articulates her
understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his
children, even his life." Id.
73 KOVACH, supra note 63, at 24.
74 There are inevitable tensions when the adversary system - with its discourse of orders and compulsions - starts to "refer matters to" and "enforce" a "voluntary" process
like mediation. For an excellent overview of these tensions, see James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case
Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171 (2001). See also Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants?
The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L. J.
1199 (2000) (examining the tension between courts and litigants who wish a court to validate non-judicial forms of dispute resolution).
75 Joint Code for Mediators, I, reprinted in KOVACH, supra note 63, at 376.
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in it or not. Put another way, mediation must sell itself to parties because the parties can walk away without buying.

2.

Perspectives

As I have already described, litigation is consumed with determining "what happened" in order to determine liabilityJ6 Judges and
juries decide "what happened" and sort liability (or penalties)
accordingly.
In contrast, mediation rejects the idea that "what happened" is a
unitary or stable "truth" to be found "out there." Instead, a primary if not the primary - thrust of mediation is that conflict resolution entails some recognition on the part of disputants that "what happened"
is informed by perspective. Literature on mediation is rife with this
idea: a critical component of mediation is that parties "begin to acknowledge another view of the situation,"77 or "[t]he challenge for
mediation is to somehow lead people to a situation where they can, at
the very least, allow two contending perceptions to coexist,"78 or to
"enable each person to see the other as the victim, and in the process,
build a new moral framework."79 This is, of course, no easy task for
almost by definition, parties to a dispute "hear completely different
music and have no appreciation for another view."80
To encourage parties to move beyond their perspective, some
mediators ask parties to "restate the opposing view" as a means to
promote their understanding of the other side's perspective. 8! This
alone highlights the utterly different dispute resolution universe inhabited by mediation: it is impossible to imagine such a mechanism
having any meaning - let alone usefulness - in the context of
litigation.

3.

Rights and Wrongs in Mediation

Given the importance of "perspective" in mediation, the very notion of "judgment" is alien to mediation, as are notions of "fault" and
even "responsibility." Issuing "judgments" (both in its legal and non76 See supra text accompanying note 35.
77 KOVACH, supra note 63, at 140.
78 Alan C. Tidwell, Not Effective Communication but Effective Persuasion, 12 MEDIATION Q. 4, 5 (1995). For an especially vivid demonstration of how a skilled mediator can
accomplish this, see Sara Cobb, Creating Sacred Space: Toward A Second-Generation Dispute Resolution Practice, 28 FORDHAM L.J. 1017, 1024-1027 (2001).
79 Cobb, supra note 78, at 103l.
80 KOVACH, supra note 63, at 160.
81 [d. An affirmative restating of another perspective - sometimes called "considering
the opposite" in the literature of social psychology - has been shown to assist people in
recognizing the validity of alternative perspectives. See Rubinson, supra note 36, at 32-34
(1996). I discuss this technique at greater length infra text accompanying notes 162-69.
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legal sense) and finding "fault" or "responsibility" impede mediation
because mediators want parties to be the authors of their own mediation. A morality tale which identifies one party as "moral" necessarily
brands the other party as not, and the "immoral" party is not likely to
"own" a process that produces such a result. 82
4.

"Time" in Mediation

Litigation looks backward in time: it seeks to resolve disputes
through historical reconstruction of past events. In contrast, mediation focuses on what needs to be done to resolve disputes in light of
present and future interests. 83 This is not to say that history - or at
least perspectives on history - does not have its place in mediation:
indeed, history in mediation might offer clues about how to resolve
controversy in the here and now, or parties might require validation of
their perspective on history - and the catharsis that describing that
history might bring - as necessary before meaningful progress can be
made towards resolving controversy.84 Nevertheless, the past in mediation is typically not the foundation for resolving conflict.85
Put another way, the present moment embodies the lifeblood of
mediation because the here and now contains the different needs that
people have and the ways that these needs can be satisfied by comple82 As one commentator notes, an "impediment to problem solving is the reluctance of
the parties to share responsibility for a dispute, let alone its resolution. The most common
reaction is an attempt to allocate blame. The mediator must get the parties to recognize
that mediation is a problem solving process which uses collaboration, and that each person
must share the responsibility for the process." KOVACH, supra note 63, at 163. Or, to put
this in more narrative terms, a morality tale necessarily closes off other tales in which
moral roles are reversed or the "morality" is subject to perspective. See Cobb & Rifkin,
supra note 39, at 72 (a story "is effective as a story because it closes off the possibility of
multiple interpretations") (emphasis in original); AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23,
at 133 ("certain narratives drive to certain endings and not others").
83 Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 39, at 71 ("[t]he mediators interest in the story is not in
the past but in the present and the future; thus the story is an instrument through which
mediators may shift attention from retrospective positions and accounts to prospective stories, effectively disconnecting the problem from its history, from its roots").
84 Dealing forthrightly and constructively with a party's emotions in light of the history
of a dispute is viewed as a fundamental skill that successful mediators should have. See,
e.g., MOORE, supra note 70, at 162-69; KOVACH, supra note 63, at 48-49. Indeed, an unreflective focus only on the future might lead mediators to discount the past or, worse, view it
as "irrelevant" with extraordinarily damaging results to parties for whom the past provides
context and meaning. Grillo, supra note 54, at 1563-64.
85 It is interesting to note how this aspect of mediation plays out in debates about the
efficacy of the adversary system. One strain in the critical literature on the adversary system doubts the ability of adversarial proceedings to "ascertain truth." See, e.g., I.P. CALLI.
SON, COURTS OF INJUSTICE 569-71 (1956) (arguing against proposition that "our
contentious system has great merit as a means of getting at the truth"). Mediation, however, sidesteps this issue and rather implicitly questions whether it is necessary (or possible) to get at "truth" in order to resolve disputes.
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menting - or at least not impinging - on the needs of others. 86 People
might want services, goods, apologies, jobs, arrangements among the
parties or among others, an opportunity to "tell my side of the story."
Mediation seeks to accommodate what people want or need now to
resolve a controversy.
5.

Narrowing and Expanding

Litigation seeks to "narrow issues" - and thereby the contested
narrative - through a panoply of procedural and substantive mechanisms: responsive pleadings, motions to dismiss, pretrial orders, the
requirement of relevance. 87 Indeed, a critical quality of legal rules
themselves is to narrow which "facts" have meaning in the contest and
which do not. Legal rules identify which circumstances are relevant
and establish temporal frames to define wrongdoing: a tort, a breach
of contract, a crime - all delineate what and when factual circumstances are meaningful to the resolution of controversy in litigation. 88
In contrast, rather than narrowing issues, the mediation process
tends to embrace openness in dialogue. Such openness encourages
parties to discuss and disclose anything that would facilitate the resolution of controversy. The idea is that the more circumstances and
possibilities are shared by the parties to mediation, the greater the
chances that the parties, with the assistance of the mediator, can find
creative ways to resolve disputes. 89
6.

Ex Parte in Spades: The "Private Caucus"

Judges are prohibited in most instances in from engaging in ex
parte communications. 90 This is a function of the ostensible "neutral86 This is related to the idea underlying "non-zero sum" solutions and the distinction
between "positions" and "interests" that are a major component in literature on negotiation. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 U.c.L.A. L. REV. 754 (1984); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM
URY, GETIING To YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 40-55 (2d ed.
1991).
87 Carrie Menkel-Meadow has argued persuasively that this narrowing process begins
even as lawyers fit client stories into legal categories prior to the commencement of litigation. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes By Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 J. DISP. RESOL. 25, 31-34 (1985).
88 Robert Rubinson, Attorney Fact-Finding, Ethical Decision-Making and the Methodology of Law, 45 ST. LoUIS UNIV. L.J. 1185, 1217-1218 (2001).
89 This aspect of mediation resonates with literature on problem solving generally,
which holds that problem solvers are most effective when they generate as many plausible
solutions to a problem as possible before evaluating the effectiveness of each. See, e.g.,
Greenebaum, supra note 65, at 123.
90 See ABA Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3B(7) ("A judge shall not initiate, permit,
or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge
outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding").
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ity" and "detachment" of judges: since judges have to determine facts,
rights, and liabilities, they must be protected from the persuasive
power of a lone advocate not subject to a response.
In contrast, what in litigation is called "ex parte communications"
is an integral and accepted part of mediation. The term of art for
these types of communications is "private caucus." Private caucuses
enable mediators to meet in private with one party, and thus without
the impediment of the other side chilling the communication.91 Given
that the job of the mediator is to facilitate parties in resolving their
disputes, these caucuses can be extraordinarily useful, for, among
other reasons, the telling of a story in the presence of a party who is
predisposed to debate virtually every point of it inhibits the teller
from being more open about doubts and possible ways to resolve a
dispute.
B.

The Non-Story of Mediation

Despite the profound differences between how judges and
mediators go about resolving disputes, parties to mediation often approach mediation with morality tales in hand. As two commentators
on mediation have put it, "all parties struggle to describe themselves
as victims; according to the logic of their stories, they are not responsible for the set of events that leads to the problem or conflict."92 As in
litigation, each party holds the other party morally culpable and responsible for harm, and thus justice and morality require that the
wrongdoer be held to account.
Nevertheless, while the competing narratives that litigants and
parties to mediation carry around in their heads prior to entering each
process are similar and sometimes identical, litigation and mediation
fundamentally diverge in what they do with them. Litigation, as we
have seen, confirms and intensifies the good versus evil contours of
litigants' stories, with decision-makers in litigation invited into the
story as agents of moral vindication. Mediation is utterly different.
Parties to mediation might arrive with contradictory versions of
Steady State to Trouble, hankering for vindication of the moral corruption of the other party. And then ... nothing happens. Or at least
nothing happens for a while. Mediators need not and should not
choose a true Trouble or assume the role of agent of moral vindication. The existence of multiple versions of "what happened" in mediation - with the inconsistent moral "truths" implied by such a
For a discussion of the uses of the private caucus in the context of mediation, see
supra note 70, at 319-26; KOVACH, supra note 63, at 164-65.
92 Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 39, at 75 (emphasis in original); WINSLADE & MONK,
supra note 20, at 7.
91

MOORE,
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divergence - does not generate the anxiety for story completion so
characteristic of litigation.
In narrative terms, then, mediation at this level has no story, or at
least no great need to generate a story. Mediators are not anxious to
"find" the "truth" of what happened, but approach dueling narratives
with an understanding that dueling narratives are, by definition, what
constitute conflict before mediation seeks to resolve it. While parties
might - and often do - expend great Efforts to convince the mediator
that they are right, mediators hope to defuse those Efforts in order to
encourage parties to focus their attention elsewhere.
Mediators decline the role of hero in another sense as well. A
mediator's "power," at least among more sophisticated mediators, derives pragmatically from results and movement generated by the mediation itself. The mediator herself mayor may not be responsible for
this: if parties are moving towards resolution through some process
and dialogue of their own devising with minimal or no intervention on
the part of the mediator, then this is a fine mediation indeed. 93
So what does a mediator do? The mediator proceeds in whatever
fashion works to facilitate a resolution of the parties' dispute.
"Whatever works" includes an array of possible strategies: retelling
each party's version of the Steady State to Trouble transition in a way
that is meaningful (and acceptable) to the participants,94 enabling participants to see "truth" in different stories about that transition,95
marginalizing the Trouble and the different stories about it in favor of
a fresh focus on how participants could construct a new Steady State
decoupled from the past,96 and so on. None of these are necessarily
exclusive and may be (and often are) used in combination.

C.

Mediation as a Story of Collaborative Striving To
Resolve Conflict

All of this is not to say that mediation does not embody what I
have previously called a "meta-narrative" with elements described by
the Austere Definition of Narrative. It does. Not surprisingly, this
93 This is not to say that a multitude of complications may not come into play, such as
instances where there is a power differential among the parties or where one party is "hiding" information from the other party. Some of these complications relate to when mediation is appropriate, and some relate the role attorneys play in the mediation process. See
infra text accompanying notes 121-22.
94 Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 39, at 86 (1991) (describing how mediators can "[w]eave
two narratives together to construct positive discursive positions for all disputants"). For
an approach to mediation that explicitly draws upon the possibilities of deconstructing and
the reconstructing disputants' narratives, see generally WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 20.
95 See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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narrative profoundly differs from that of litigation. The engine that
drives litigation's morality tale is that conflict resolution is a contest
between parties, one of whom necessarily represents good and the
other necessarily represents bad. 97 As a result, litigation seeks to designate who has committed moral transgressions by breaching legal
norms (or, from the perspective of the defendant, who wrongfully accuses others of having done SO).98
The Story of Mediation subverts these norms by transforming this
familiar morality tale into a story of collaboration. This subversion
begins through how mediation conceives of conflict itself. Implicit in
the Story of Litigation is that conflict represents a breach of the norms
of conduct, thereby ripping the social fabric in some way large or
small. 99 In contrast, in mediation, conflict is a norm of conduct, a necessary byproduct of humans having distinct experiences and personalities and needs. Conflict is thus not necessarily a disruption of the
moral order, and, indeed, can sometimes be productive. lOo
Mediation's normalization of conflict, however, cannot eliminate
what appears to be a deep-seated human need to understand experience in terms of struggles and strivings. Humans have great difficulty
perceiving events as generated by causes beyond our control - what
Amsterdam and Bruner evocatively describe as an inability to see
events as "One Damn Thing After Another."101 We must instead
"shape them into strivings and adversities, contests and rewards, vanquishings and setbacks."102 The meta-narrative of litigation maps
these "strivings" and "vanquishings" onto the struggle of one party
against another and enlists the aid of the court to vindicate justice on
behalf of the wronged party. In contrast, the meta-narrative of mediation seeks to map these "strivings" and "vanquishings" onto a collaborative struggle to resolve conflict. This narrative casts all participants
as players in a process - collaboration - that is focused on reaching
the common goal of successfully resolving or transforming a dispute.1°3 This story has moral entailments because collaboration is ac97 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 39.
98 See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
99 See supra text accompanying note 34.
100 One leading commentator, for example, notes that "conflict can be an exciting and
inspiring experience." KOVACH, supra note 63, at 3. A substantial literature on conflict
resolution at the organizational level tends to view conflict as an inevitable byproduct of
human interactions that must be dealt systematically and forthrightly. See, e.g., CATHY A.
COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS: A GUIDE To CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS 4 (1996)
("conflict is an organizational fact of life, neither good nor bad").
101 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 31.
102 [d.
103 This difference in stories can also be framed purposively. The goal of litigation is to
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cepted as a social and moral good. Unlike litigation, however, this
story does not generate a binary moral universe that divides the good
from the bad, but, rather, a universe that values collaborative striving
to achieve common ground and resolution.
This story places mediators in a role that is very different from
the role played by decision-makers in litigation. Rather than being
heroes of moral vindication to whom wronged parties appeal for justice, mediators promote and model collaborative striving to overcome
conflict. This plays out in many accepted techniques in mediation.
Mediators, for example, often seek "commitment" from participants
to the process of mediation, although mediators are careful not to extend this commitment to a commitment to agree. 104 This commitment
to process is a proxy for a commitment to collaborate to seek to resolve conflict, thus incrementally moving participants away from contested litigation and towards collaborative problem solving. Similarly,
mediators often "reframe" participants' statements in order to emphasize "common ground. "105 This is also an effort to move parties away
from a morally charged contest and into collaboration. Finally,
mediators encourage and model collaboration through a positive message of optimism and progress towards resolution, even when (or, perhaps, especially when) impasse appears likely.106
Moreover, mediation approaches the narrative movement from
Efforts to Restoration of Steady State in a very different way than litigation. 107 Whether the Steady State is Restored or Transformed constitutes what I have earlier characterized as a "fork in the road" in the
Austere Definition of Narrative.108 The very language through which
litigants seek redress of grievances - to "be made whole," "to pay
your debt society" (with its implication that payment of the debt
would return the ledger to balance), even the word "remedy" - implies Restoration. In contrast, mediation tends to reject Restoration as
a state to which the parties (and society as whole) should or even can
return. Rather, mediation seeks Transformation on the part of all disputants so that conflict is resolved. 109 It does so by embracing the
win, and that means defeating the other party. The goal of mediation is to resolve conflicts, and that means overcoming whatever impediments there are to achieving resolution.
104 See, e.g., KOVACH, supra note 63, at 85; Tidwell, supra note 78, at 11.
105 See, Tidwell, supra note 78, at 11-12.
106 Kimberlee Kovach, for example, suggests that mediators do the following when mediation faces impasse: "Use words of encouragement. If any progress at all has been made,
acknowledge and positively reinforce it. This can go a long way in motivating further
movement." KOVACH, supra note 63, at 166
107 See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
108 See supra text accompanying note 33.
109 This aspect of mediation goes back to Lon Fuller - a central and early scholar of
mediation - who noted that "the central quality of mediation [is] its capacity to reorient
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notion that perceptions of the world (including perceptions of the actions of others) are unstable, thus enabling parties to appreciate alternative perspectives as a way to promote resolution of conflict. l1O
Mediation, therefore, does embody a plot that adheres to the narrative movement described by the Austere Definition, albeit in ways
that are utterly alien to the morality tale of the story of litigation. The
story of mediation can be characterized as follows:
Steady State: Whatever Each Party Views as Pre-Conflict
Trouble: Whatever Each Party Views as Constituting Conflict
Efforts: Collaborative Striving To Overcome Conflict as Modeled
and Promoted by Mediator
Transformation of Steady State: A New Relationship Among Parties
Coda: Moving On

V.

CLIENT COUNSELING AND CONFLICT

So litigation and mediation create distinctive factual and moral
worlds, and these worlds can be described narratively. What does this
mean for lawyers practicing in the field? If, as I have described, the
Story of Litigation and the Story of Mediation create different worlds,
"explaining" mediation in a meaningful way is a profound challenge
that requires subtlety and creativity. Lawyers and legal educators, as
practitioners and teachers of client counseling, should confront the
challenge head on. Approaching litigation and mediation in narrative
terms offers great promise in meeting this challenge. However, it also
poses challenges to more traditional conceptions of the role of lawyers
in mediation and in counseling clients about mediation.
A.

Lawyers and Mediation

Practitioners of mediation have historically had an uneasy relationship with the practicing bar. Many view lawyers as conflict-intenthe parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to
achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect
their attitudes and dispositions toward one another." Lon Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms
and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971). See also WINS LADE & MONK, supra
note 20, at 26 (describing stance of mediator as "coauthor" in helping disputants reconstitute their dispute).
My use of the term "Transformation" should not be confused with the specific approach to mediation called "transformative mediation." See supra note 66. That said, the
narrative understanding of "Transformation" is largely consistent with "transformative mediation," although theorists and practitioners of transformative mediation hold that mediation should focus not on resolution of a particular conflict, but transformation of parties'
interactions with each other. Id.
110 This post-modern note in mediation theory and practice has become more explicit in
recent years. See, e.g., WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 20, at 3.
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sifiers due to training, temperament, and financial self-interest. lll
Indeed, the very rise of mediation may in part be attributable to its
promise of moving lawyers to the margins and offering parties a direct
voice in resolving their own controversies. As a result, lawyers are
viewed in some quarters as at best necessary evils in mediation.u 2
Some state statutes go further and empower mediators to ban lawyers
from mediation sessions.113 Moreover, to the extent lawyers in recent
years increasingly participate in mediation,114 the type of mediation
favored or assumed to be "mediation" by lawyers - so-called "evaluative mediation"115 - tends to strip mediation of its more distinctive
characteristics. What often remains is something very familiar: an adversarial hearing that adheres to the story of litigation and that, while
perhaps resolving conflict, does not differ in a meaningful way from
litigation.116
Even so, growing numbers of commentators both in and out of
the world of mediation view lawyers as potentially constructive forces
for promoting the resolution of conflict. Robert J. Gilson and Robert
H. Mnookin, for example, drawing on game theory, see a corps of
attorneys who adopt a "cooperative" stance as having "the potential
for damping rather than exacerbating the conflictual character of litigation."l17 In a different but related vein, Carrie Menkel-Meadow
111 For a discussion of many lawyers' ignorance or antipathy towards mediation due to
"how lawyers look at the world, the economics and structure of contemporary law practice,
and the lack of training in mediation," see Leonard Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43
OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 57-59 (1982). See also Sternlight, supra note 46, at 315 (describing how
lawyers' "economic incentives" and "psychological makeups" may inhibit a negotiated or
mediated settlement).
112 See KOVACH, supra note 63, at 98-99; Sternlight, supra note 46, at 269 ("[m]any
believe that lawyers' adversarial methods and mind sets are inherently inconsistent with
mediation").
113 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4351.5(e) (2002) ("[t]he mediator shall have the authority to exclude counsel from participation in the mediation proceedings where, in the discretion of the mediator, exclusion of counsel is deemed by the mediator to be appropriate or
necessary"). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(a)(6) (providing that only parties may
attend certain family mediation sessions).
114 See Sternlight, supra note 46, at 277-278 (citing statistics about and describing how
attorneys "are ... accompanying their clients to many mediations").
115 See supra text accompanying note 65.
116 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 65, at 252 (discussing how lawyer's involvement in mediation "has given rise to charges that they are making ADR more adversarial and legalistic"). Some evidence suggests that this is so because lawyers tend to assume that "they
'know it all' about mediation" without the necessary background and training - an assumption that leads these lawyers to adopt a conventional adversarial stance within the mediation process. See Susan w. Harrell, Why Lawyers Attend Mediation Sessions, 12
MEDIATION Q. 369, 372 (1995).
117 Robert J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing through Agents: Cooperation and
Conflict between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 510-12 (1994). Gilson and
Mnookin, citing the matrimonial bar in San Francisco, argue that this is in fact the case in
some contexts. ld.
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and others hope to replace the prevailing lawyer-as-zealous-advocate
paradigm with the notion that effective lawyers are problem solvers. lI8 Lawyers as problem solvers bear little resemblance to traditional advocates; they perceive "cases" as embodying a set of needs
and interests that might be resolved (or not) depending on the choice
of dispute resolution process. 119
Lawyers can indeed playa crucial role in counseling clients about
and appearing with clients in mediation. 120 Lawyers, for example, can
help neutralize "power imbalances" between parties that mediation
can recapitulate or exacerbate 121 and can protect clients from the sub118 See, e.g., Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn't Everything: The Lawyer as
Problem-Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as
Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72
TEMPLE L. REV. 785 (1999); Nolan-Haley, supra note 65, at 246-249; Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and Problem Solvers, 58 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1995). Some law school case books also explicitly adopt this perspective. See, e.g., LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION
AND LAWYERS (2d ed. 1997).
Another line of critique is framed in terms of how lawyers need to take into account
the impact that their clients' actions might have on third parties in order to vindicate other
values. The two preeminent theorists in this line are William H. Simon, who draws upon
"justice" as a value that sometimes trumps client autonomy, and David Luban, who draws
upon "common morality" as a key value. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JusTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN
ETHICAL STUDY (1988). See also Rubinson, supra note 88, at 1195-1200 (summarizing and
contrasting the views of Simon and Luban). A recent colloquium examined these issues in
detail. Colloquium, What Does It Mean To Practice Law "In the Interests of Justice" in the
Twenty-First Century?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1543 (2002).
119 For an excellent summary of problem-solving lawyering and the literature surrounding it, see Nolan-Haley, supra note 65, at 247-249.
120 Despite the obvious significance of such a role for attorneys, it is striking how little
has been written on this topic. For two thoughtful exceptions, see Sternlight, supra note 46,
at 275-291(summarizing existing literature on the meaning of advocacy in mediation);
McEwan, et ai, supra note 68. Moreover, there is even less literature on how attorneys
should go about counseling clients about the nature of mediation - a primary concern of
this Article.
121 The problem of power differentials among parties to mediation has been the subject
of vigorous debate, particularly when the disadvantaged parties are women or minorities.
See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 54; Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984);
Penelope Eileen Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The Lawyer's Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L.Q. 177 (1994); Connie J.A. Beck & Bruce D. Sales, A Critical Reappraisal
of Divorce Mediation Research and Policy, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 989 (2000); Richard Delgado et aI., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1387-91. But see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) (arguing that in some instances mediation is more suitable for
"female needs" than litigation). A core problem is that one of the great virtues of mediation - its flexibility and lack of external constraints imposed by legal rules or court-imposed judgments - can also be its greatest weakness: a recourse to rights and rules has long
been a path to empowerment, and a process free of such constraints may subtly or not so
subtly recapitulate the subordination of already subordinated parties. See Grillo, supra
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tle or not so subtle coercion "bad" mediators can exercise. 122 Lawyers, however, must confront an initial challenge before getting to
these issues: how can clients even consider or think about mediation
when the morality tale they have in their heads is something mediation hopes to transform?
B.

Dislodging the Litigation Narrative

Given that litigation and mediation embody different narratives
and thereby generate different disputes,123 there seems to be a
straightforward way for lawyers to encourage clients to understand
and consider a mediation alternative. Lawyers can advise a client
about how different modes of dispute resolution generate different
disputes, describe different dispute resolution processes that might be
available, and present how a dispute might look when filtered through
the processes of each.
But it is not that easy. Clients typically come to a lawyer's office
note 54, at 1557-58; Delgado et aI., supra, at 1391-99; Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 100
YALE L.J. 1073, 1078 (1984) (arguing how a court-rendered judgment "Iessen[s] the impact
of distributional inequalities"). Lawyers can diminish this concern by enhancing the ability
of clients to make meaningful choices about whether to pursue mediation and to equalize
power in the mediation itself. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 46, at 274 (1999) (while in
some situations an "attorney should frequently stop herself from dominating the mediation," in others "the attorney must be active and assertive to ensure that her client is not
coerced by the opposing party"); Penelope Eileen Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The
Lawyer's Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L.Q. 177, 192 (1994) (arguing for strong
advocacy by lawyers for clients who are likely to be at risk in mediation); Susan W. Harrell, Why Attorneys Attend Mediation Sessions, 12 MEDIATION Q. 369, 371 (1995) (some
Florida lawyers who attended family law mediation described their presence as helping to
protect clients "from themselves," "from the opposing parties," and "from the opposing
attorneys"). See also McEwan et. ai, supra note 68, at 1319 (arguing that lawyers have a
constructive role to play in family mediation).
122 In a stunning perversion of the collaborative spirit that mediation hopes to foster,
mediators have coerced parties into entering agreements by labeling them as "uncooperative" unless they do so. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 54, at 1603 (arguing that mediation that
"sells itself" as a relational mode of dispute resolution can be "disastrous" when it in fact
acts coercively); Bryan, supra note 121. While such instances do not mean that we should
condemn mediation because there are bad mediators just as we do not condemn surgery
because there are bad surgeons, it is still troubling that bad mediators can cause so much
damage through a process that is, by definition, largely private, confidential and not subject
to external review. As a result, a greater understanding on the part of clients about what
mediation should or can be - an understanding that lawyers in counseling sessions are in a
wonderful position to promote - may empower clients to recognize bad mediation when
they see it. For a rare instance when an alleged "bad mediator" was actually subjected to
judicial scrutiny, albeit unsuccessfully, see Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp.2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998)
(court declined to hear plaintiffs' attempt to repudiate settlement agreement reached in
mediation; plaintiffs contended that mediator coerced settlement by threatening that they
"would be responsible for paying all attorneys' fees and costs if [they] did not agree to
settle and that they would be 'financially ruined' ").
123 As one commentator has succinctly put it, "[h]ow the dispute is conceived is influenced by how the story is told." Greenebaum, supra note 65, at 121.
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with litigation narratives in place. 124 These narratives run deep. After
all, it is extraordinarily difficult to deconstruct one's own experience,
for it seems transparent to us that what we have experienced is what
is.125 As a result, to most disputants, the binary moral universe of the
litigation narrative is the universe, with the goods and evils and rights
and wrongs arrayed as they are. Yet in order to make room for the
mediation alternative, lawyers must dislodge this narrative, or at least
encourage clients to consider the possibility of alternatives. 126
One way of understanding how lawyers can do so is to consider
the fluid nature of conflict. A "dispute" or "controversy" is not a unitary, static "thing," but rather an assemblage of competing stories,
motivations, and interests. Disputes are dynamic, ever-changing phenomena. 127 They undergo transformations: "individuals define and
redefine their perceptions of experience and the nature of their grievances in response to the communications, behavior, and expectations
of a range of people, including opponents, agents, authority figures,
companions, and intimates."128
As this process unfolds, lawyers inevitably shape disputants' perceptions of a controversy in a multitude of ways,129 including the
moral dimension of disputes and the attribution of responsibility.13°
124 See WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 20, at 7 (describing how disputants prior to
mediation adhere to an "externalizing, blaming description" of other disputants); J. Brad
Reich, Attorney v. Client: Creating a Mechanism to Address Competing Process Interests in
Lawyer-Driven Mediation, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 183, 189-192 (2002) (examining studies demonstrating that clients "rarely" or "never" requested the use of ADR).
125 As two leading social psychologists have put it, "people fail to recognize the degree
to which their interpretations of the situation are just that - constructions and inferences
rather than faithful reflections of some objective and invariant reality." LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBElT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECrIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 85 (1991).
126 In keeping with the stranger than fiction flavor of much modern physics, there is an
established hypothesis that there really are "multiple universes." See TIMOTHY FERRIS,
THE WHOLE SHEBANG 260-63 (1998).
127 See Lynn Mather & Barbara Yngvesson, Language, Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes, 15 L. & Soc. REv. 775, 776 (1980-1981) ("a dispute is not a static event
which simply 'happens, but ... the structure of disputes, quarrels, and offenses includes
changes or transformations over time") (emphasis in original). This conception of "dispute" resonates with ideas usually associated with "social constructivism" about the fluid
and unstable nature of "reality" in general. See, e.g., WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 20,
at 38.
128 Felstiner, et aI., supra note 44, at 638.
129 Id. at 641. Felstiner et al. describe how attributing moral responsibility shifts as a
dispute unfolds over time: "[A]ttibutions themselves are not fixed. As moral coloration is
modified by new information, logic, insight, or experience, attributions are changed, and
they alter the participants' understanding of their experience ... Some processes, such as
counseling, may drain the dispute of moral content and diffuse responsibility for problems:
others, like direct confrontation or litigation, may intensify the disputant's moral judgment
and focus blame." Id.
130 For a scrupulous and detailed description of the complexity of how meaning is made
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Indeed, attorneys appear at critical junctures in the life of a controversy. In an influential article, William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L.
Abel, and Austin Sarat argue that disputes proceed through a series of
dynamic stages they call "naming, blaming, and claiming."!31 After an
"injurious experience" is perceived and "named," the experience may
be transformed into a grievance - a "blaming" - "when a person attributes an injury to the fault of another individual or social entity."132
The grievance may then be transformed into a "claim" when someone
with a grievance "voices it to the person or entity believed to be responsible and asks for some remedy."133 The final stage - a transformation from "claim" to "dispute" - occurs when a claim is explicitly
or implicitly rejected. 134 All of these stages are themselves unstable
and open to reinterpretation by those who are experiencing them.
Lawyers usually enter the scene at the "claiming" or "disputing" stage
just when a disputant is poised (or forced) to turn to a more formalized process of dispute resolution.
This model does not require or assume a particular process
through which disputes should be resolved. Nevertheless, given the
cultural norms of litigation and the stories told within those norms,
most disputants conceptualize their naming, blaming, claiming, and
disputing through the story of litigation. As Felstiner, Abel and Sarat
put it, "institutional patterns restrict the options open to disputants"
who wish to pursue a "claim,"135 and the "normal" way to resolve
disputes has long been litigation.
"Institutional patterns," however, are not set in stone. Indeed, in
the twenty odd years since the appearance of the Felstiner, Abel and
Sarat article, the growth of mediation has generated new options for
dispute resolution. Lawyers, as the cultural actors with prime responsibility for enacting ways of "claiming" and "disputing," are especially
well positioned to encourage clients to consider fresh "patterns" of
dispute resolution such as mediation. While no doubt an enormous
challenge, experience suggests that this is not an impossible one. The
very fact that mediation can and does work with some frequency despite the force of the litigation narrative demonstrates that lawyers
in attorney-client interactions, see William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of
Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1447 (1992).
\31 Felstiner, et al., supra note 44. For a recent elaboration by Austin Sarat of these
ideas in the context of popular culture, see Austin Sarat, Exploring the Hidden Domains of
Civil Justice: ''Naming, Blaming, and Claiming" in Popular Culture, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
425 (2000).
132 Felstiner, et al., supra note 44, at 635.
\33 Id.
134 Id. at 636.
135 Id. at 636.
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have at least a chance to dislodge the "truth" of the litigation frame
when interacting with clients.
A number of factors favor client receptivity to mediation even
prior to client counseling. First, conceptions of conflict tend to be
fluid and subject to reinterpretation. There is thus tension between
the persistence and rigidity of the litigation narrative and the continuing instability and reinterpretation of our experience. 136 Tension in
this context, however, is not necessarily a bad thing; lawyers can build
upon the instability of conflict in order to encourage clients to reinterpret conflict in terms of alternative narratives. Second, the unsavory
dimensions of litigation - its almost inevitable expense, delay, acrimony, and uncertainty, among other things - are commonplaces in
popular culture and act as a powerful incentive to embrace alternatives. Moreover, lawyers are, by definition, situated apart from clients' circumstances. This added distance enables a lawyer to see a
client's perspective as a perspective, with other perspectives and stories potentially in play.137

C.

What About Client-Centered Lawyering?

Before considering more specifically how lawyers can engage in
136 This idea recalls the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, who wrote that language emdobies
both "centrifugal" and "centripetal" forces that tend to pull in opoposite directions: centripetal forces, originating in political and cultural influences, unify meaning, while
centrifugal forces, originating in "the plurality of experience," decentralize and destabilize
meaning. M.M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION 271-72 (Michael Holquist ed. &
Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans. 1981).
137 The perspective I am proposing is that of an anti-formalist - a stance that holds that
there is not a reality, but interpretations about reality that can in turn be reinterpreted, put
together, and taken apart in lots of different ways. For a provocative vision of anti-formalism and its consequences, see STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE,
RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 1-33
(1989). It should be noted that in a sense, good lawyers are already anti-formalists. In a
classic study of Chicago lawyers conducted some thirty years ago, practitioners identified
"understanding the viewpoints of others" as a primary skill in the practice of law. FRANCES KAHN ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION
125 (1981). Indeed, it is commonplace that astute lawyers consider the perspectives of
adversaries to prepare for direct and cross-examination and to construct theories of the
case. Similarly, effective negotiators examine events from the perspective of adversaries in
order to anticipate their stance in the negotiation. See, e.g., ROBERT M. BASTRESS &
JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING AND NEGOTIATION: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 407 (1990) (describing the importance of determining what
"opponents mean when they describe historical facts, assert legal positions, or comment on
other matters important to the negotiation"); HARRY T. EDWARDS & JAMES J. WHITE,
THE LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR 112 (1977) (describing how "[i]n every negotiation a principal responsibility of the negotiator is to find his opponents' settling point"). Nevertheless,
lawyers have classically employed these techniques in order to construct an effective story
within the litigation narrative, not as a means to dislodge the litigation narrative in order to
open space for alternative narratives of dispute resolution.
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the types of client counseling that I am suggesting, one question is
worth addressing: How does counseling clients about mediation fit in
with "client-centered" lawyering and counseling?138 A classic clientcentered, non-interventionist approach holds that a lawyer's job is to
"translate" a client's grievance in all of its complexity into language
and strategies appropriate to legal process. 139 This conception, quite
rightly in my view, encourages lawyers to approach clients as autonomous agents embodying a complex web of legal and non-legal concerns, not merely a set of legal issues or interests. 140
Problems arise, however, when a client-centered view assumes
that clients come into lawyer's offices with preferences, opinions, and,
most importantly for our purposes, narratives fixed. Such a view suggests that in order to respect and vindicate a client's autonomy, a lawyer must take a client as she is and preserve at all costs a client's
preexisting sense of goals and conceptions of "what happened." This
vastly simplifies the complexity, dynamism, and instability of the
meaning-making process. 141
In fact, dislodging the litigation narrative is precisely what effective client-centered counseling has long been understood to be: an opportunity for lawyers to "expose clients to alternatives and
consequences" in resolving a matter and "provide an opportunity to
evaluate options and consequences."142 This process is a wonderfully
effective means to explore whether mediation might be appropriate
for a particular dispute, for client counseling, like mediation, embraces the here and now of the unique situation facing a unique client.
Dislodging the litigation narrative does not mean that clients
should cede autonomy to lawyers, or that lawyers manipulate clients
to come around to what lawyers perceive to be a more positive view of
138 The first and most influential treatment of client-centered lawyering is DAVID
BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED ApPROACH (1977). A more recent revision of this work IS DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL
BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED ApPROACH (1991).
139 See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text:
Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving
and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 861 (1992).
140 See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship:
The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1986); BINDER ET AL., supra note 138,
at 261.
141 I explore this point at greater length in Robert Rubinson, Constructions of Client
Competence and Theories of Practice, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 148-59 (1999). For other critiques and reappraisals of conceptions of client-centered lawyering, see Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501

(1990).
142 BINDER ET AL., supra note 138, at 272-80 (1991).
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dispute resolution. Rather, a lawyer's job is to explode the myth of a
thing called a "dispute" that gets resolved through a thing called "litigation." This enables clients to exercise a meaningful choice about
whether mediation is appropriate, thus vindicating client autonomy at
its deepest level.
VI.

MEDIATION-TALK IN CLIENT COUNSELING:

A

PROPOSED TOOLKIT

To restate the challenge: virtually all clients have long internalized what trials look like (or at least what trials on television and in
film look like) and what effective advocacy in that setting should be.
As a result, a client is likely to conceptualize a case as a morality tale
in which the client is right and adversaries are wrong, and conceive of
her lawyer as a "zealous advocate" who will "fight" (the metaphor is
telling) so that a client's cause will prevail. From this perspective, mediation-talk might seem "soft" or demonstrate a lack of commitment
to the justice or truth of a client's cause. 143 Some general description
or definition of mediation - such as the one I quoted earlier144 - will
likely fail in assisting a client in understanding what mediation is, let
alone engage a client in what mediation can do.
Thus, while the pursuit of mediation might well be in a client's
interest for a host of reasons, many clients will at least initially view
mediation - and lawyers who talk about the potential of mediation with skepticism. If clients are to make informed decisions about pursuing mediation and to participate meaningfully in mediation itself,
clients must understand the process at as deep a level as possible. The
following represents a toolkit from which lawyers can choose in order
to make this happen.
A.

Holding Conflict at a Distance: "Managing Controversy"

Litigation has been entrenched in popular imagination for so long
that it has taken on the status of being a thing of nature. Its status as
the way to resolve disputes is beyond question: shouts of "I'm going to
take this court!" have meat and meaning, while "I'm going to take this
to mediation!" sounds at best offbeat.
143 See Sternlight, supra note 46, at 320 ("[c]lients typically hire attorneys with the idea
that they will be their 'gladiators,' who will attempt to convince the world of the virtue of
the clients' position"); Marguerite Millhauser, The Unspoken Resistance to Alternative Dispute Resolution, 3 NEGOT. J. 29, 31 (1987) ("most clients, when it comes to their own
matters, relish the concept of 'lawyer as hired gun' "). The specific expectations that clients
have of lawyers also means that techniques employed by mediators to dislodge existing
client narratives in mediation are not necessarily effective or applicable in an attorneyclient relationship.
144 See supra text accompanying note 70.
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Nevertheless, trends that I have identified in this article - the rise
of the story of mediation and conceiving a lawyer as "problemsolver"145 to take the two most prominent examples, although there
are others 146 - have begun ever so slowly to break through the monopoly that litigation advocacy has had on how lawyers and, by extension, of how clients view the world. These trends tend to normalize
conflict by stripping away its right-wrong, religious-moral cast,
thereby transforming conflict into a more natural and tractable
phenomenon.
This holds a lesson for counseling clients about mediation. Instead of merely assuming the familiar role of "zealous advocate," lawyers can speak in explicit terms of a lawyer-client collaboration "to
manage controversy."147 This approach is perhaps both most helpful
and most counterintuitive when litigation appears to be the obvious,
natural, and perhaps only course available to the client. Assume, for
example, a commercial client who is outraged at the poor performance of another company with whom it had contracted to provide
computer software and hardware. A template for a "managing controversy" approach would be as follows:
I hear how frustrated you've been and continue to be, and how you
feel that you and your company have been taken advantage of. I
also understand how much money your business has lost as a result
of the failure of Computer Consultants to perform under the conSee supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
One example is "therapeutic jurisprudence," the task of which a leading commentator defines as "to identify - and ultimately to examine empirically - relationships between
legal arrangements and therapeutic outcomes" as a means to pursue law reform. David B.
Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in EsSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 8 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds. 1991).
See also Barbara A Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law Jurisprudence:
Application of an Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L. J. 775 (1997). For
connections between therapeutic jurisprudence and forms of mediation, see Gary Paquin
& Linda Harvey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Transformative Mediation and Narrative Mediation: A Natural Connection, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 167 (2002). Another approach is
called "preventive law," the purpose of which is to explore ways lawyers can help clients
avoid future conflicts. See, e.g., ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, PREVENTIVE LAWYERING xl
(1997) (preventive lawyering "deals with a published case as a kind of failure, representing
an unfortunate breakdown in the system in which parties or lawyers failed to anticipate
possible conflict and take preventive measures"). In yet another related trend, some lawyers art, recognizing how taking a more holistic view of clients generates more effective
representation and more satisfied clients. See, e.g,. David E. Rovella, The Best Defense . .. ,
NAT'L L. J. Jan. 31, 2000, at Al (describing indigent criminal defense attorneys who practice "holistic advocacy"); Steven Keeva, The Nicest Tough Firm Around, AB.A J., May
1999, at 60 (describing personal injury firm in Michigan that has adopted a "holistic approach" to the needs of its clients).
147 The formulation "conflict management" is often used in the literature on constructing mechanisms within organizations to deal with conflict. See, e.g., COSTANTINO &
MERCHANT, supra note 57.
145

146
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tract, and how you think that your company will continue to lose
money due to the problems with the computers. You've also asked
me about suing Computer Consultants for damages, which is,
you've told me, the option that you see as available and one that
you'd like to discuss more.
In thinking about what you can do, let's talk about ways to try to
manage this situation in a way that best meets your goals. You've
already mentioned litigation, something that certainly is an option.
Another possibility to think about is mediation. Do you know anything about mediation?

Note that there is no dramatic shift here, no lightening bolts or
surging violins. The lawyer does not - nor should - directly attack or
contradict the Story of Litigation that has plainly informed the narrative that the client has already shared. To the contrary, through conventional techniques of "active listening" well-established in the
interviewing and counseling literature,148 the lawyer "reflects back"
the client's moral and emotional universe while, at the same time, not
passing judgment on whether this universe is right or wrong, justified
or unjustified.
What the lawyer here and in succeeding interactions might do,
however, is to begin the process of promoting a sense of disputes as
constructions. The notion of conflict management does this by embodying a distancing rhetoric: the act of managing conflict is necessarily separate from the conflict itself. This opens up space between the
representation and the controversy - a space that offers room to examine options and the stories that might be generated through these
options - with greater clarity than might be otherwise possible. 149
Such a space does not exist when lawyer and client unreflectively assume that litigation - or even settlement within the adversarial process - is what the representation is about.
Another virtue of this technique is that it serves as a kind of way
station before the much riskier and problematic step of collaborating
with an opposing party to resolve conflict. As attorney and client hold
"controversy" up for examination, the role of the opposing party
might shift from villain to something far less morally charged, say "an
element of the controversy to be managed." With pragmatism ascendant and the attorney modeling the value of collaboration, the next
step - understanding the potential value of mediation as a collabora148 See, e.g., BINDER, ET AL, supra note 138, at 52-68. Interestingly, "active listening" is
also a standard technique employed by mediators. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 70, at 16566.
149 The technique and goals that I sketch here resonates with a strategy called "externalizing conversation" that can be profitably employed by mediators as well. WINSLADE &
MONK, supra note 20, at 143-47.
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tion among all participants to resolve conflict - requires far less of a
leap than it otherwise would.
The "managing controversy" mode may therefore subtly shift a
client's conception of conflict away from the usual and the accepted.
This may reverberate in many directions, from altering the contours of
the attorney-client relationship to shifting a client's sense of the conflict at issue are and how it may be resolved.
B.

The Cultural Norms Reflected in the Story of Mediation

Some have observed an odd dynamic whereby cultural imperatives tend to be mutually contradictory: for every impulse to "love thy
neighbor" there is another impulse to "stand up for your own," for
every political impulse towards "compromise" and "bipartisanship"
there is another impulse towards "principle" and "fighting for what
you believe is right."150
Despite the prevalence of the litigation morality tale, it is, of
course, not the only tale people tell about the world. Certainly the
distinctive characteristics of the Story of Litigation - its construction
of a binary moral universe, its certainty of one truth and one true understanding of justice, its appeal to a higher power to vindicate morality and truth - all reflect deeply embedded cultural norms. 15I That
said, so does the Story of Mediation: its embrace of the subjectivity of
experience ("there are two sides to every story"; "beauty is in the eye
of the beholder"), of the creativity of collaboration ("two heads are
better than one"), of the moral goodness and value of collaboration
and cooperation when struggling to overcome a common enemy ("one
for all and all for one";152 if "we don't hang together we shall all surely
150 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 229. At least in terms of the Austere
Definition of Narrative, what I am here calling "impulses" often structure experience in
narrative terms.
151 The reason why the story of litigation is so culturally resonant is a large and complex
question beyond the scope of this Article. Some speculation on its origins: While positivism might be rare in the academy, popular Western culture tends to conceive of truth as
truth and justice as justice. In addition, as a philosophical and perhaps psychological matter, the narratives that engage us most almost invariably involve human agents doing the
right or wrong thing. There appears to be some sort of deep-seated human need in this:
embracing the significance of circumstance or happenstance in causing events appears at
best "soft" or at worst "scary," perhaps because it questions the role that "responsibility"
plays in events, or the degree to which humans can control events. The so-called "prime
attribution error" that I discussed earlier is an empirically demonstrated manifestation of
this tendency. See supra note 43. Finally, as I also alluded to earlier, an appeal to a higher
authority for justice and the vindication of morality reflects an important dimension of the
Judeo-Christian tradition.
152 This is, of course, the cry of Alexandre Dumas' Three Musketeers, but the phrase has
become a commonplace of popular culture.
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hang separately"153) all resonate with dimensions of the cultural landscape that are alive and meaningful.
As a result, while clients might not be used to approaching dispute resolution in terms of the Story of Mediation, this is more an
artifact of the current norms of dispute resolution than of the norms
of experience more generally. The cultural resonance of the Story of
Mediation is therefore fertile ground for lawyers to till in client counseling. Lawyers can call to mind these norms by appropriating folk
wisdom when describing the mediation process, by describing mediation processes that lawyers have experienced or observed that call to
mind norms reflected by the Story of Mediation, and by asking clients
about experiences that they might have had that reflect these norms.

C.

Telling the Story of Mediation

A primary thrust of my approach thus far has been the central
role that narrative plays in structuring our experience 154 and, more
particularly, the central role that narrative plays in structuring disputes,155 The Story of Mediation and examples of stories that are told
within the Story of Mediation therefore hold great explanatory power.
In contrast, descriptions that are too analytic or dryly definitionaP56
have scant power to evoke the potential of mediation.
There are many ways to use narrative as a means to explain mediation. One approach builds upon the narrative structure of mediation
and litigation that I have already described.1 57 A lawyer's first challenge would be to defamiliarize the Story of Litigation by making this
"natural," unremarkable process strange.1 58 This can be done in narrative terms. Discourses on narrative theory are not necessary. For
example, a lawyer can explain that litigation is a process through
which parties seek to convince a decision-maker that they are factually and morally right. 159 This process generates a contest or struggle
between parties in which there are designated winners and losers. In
contrast, mediation promotes a process through which all participants
- parties, lawyers, mediator - struggle not against one another, but to
153 The remark is usually ascribed to Benjamin Franklin at the signing of the Declaration of Independence, although this may be apocryphal. RONALD W. CLARK, BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN: A BIOGRAPHY 286 (1983). Whatever its historical grounding, this phrase has
long passed into an oft-repeated piece of folk wisdom.
154 See supra text accompanying notes 19-32.
155 See supra text accompanying notes 33-110.
156 See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 33-110.
158 See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 4.
159 See supra text accompanying notes 34-50.
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collaborate to resolve conflict. 160 The distinctive aspects of mediation
that I described earlier - mediation's focus on a client's "ownership"
of the process, its focus on the present and future interests and circumstances rather than solely on "what happened," its breaking down
of a unitary perspective, its open-ended expansiveness, its pragmatism
- would further highlight how stories generated within mediation differ from the stories generated within litigation.
Perhaps a crucial complement to this technique is to share "war
stories" with clients. As lawyers gain experience in mediation or even
as attorneys new to mediation read and learn more about it, the telling
of actual stories of mediation (with, of course, the appropriate preservation of confidentiality) brings the Story of Mediation to life in a real
and compelling way.

D.

The Vocabulary of Mediation

Words matter. While the law is full of jargon, much of the standard language of litigation has long infiltrated everyday discourse:
"claims," "defends," "defenses," "argues," "positions," "rights." Even
the procedural vocabulary peculiar to litigation is everywhere: "testify"
, "evidence"
, "relevance"
, "ruling"
, "J'udgment"
. These words are
suffused with the procedures and narrative entailments of litigation.
The norms of mediation imply a different vocabulary: "interests,"
"goals," "resolutions," "facilitation," "cooperation," "collaboration,"
"perspectives." By avoiding the vocabulary of litigation - or even explicitly telling clients what this vocabulary is and what the vocabulary
of mediation tends to be - a lawyer would be assisting a client in understanding mediation more thoroughly. Moreover, self-conscious
adoption of these words when counseling clients may begin to generate a different set of "relevant facts" and, thus, a different "dispute,"
for these words implicate the story of mediation. 161
The use of these words is not merely an exercise in "softening"
or, more colloquially, to make "touchy-feely" the process of dispute
resolution. Indeed, a subtext of some critics of mediation - typically
those with legal training - is that mediation is somehow less logical,
rigorous or creative than litigation. Very much to the contrary, however, mediation can be and often is an extraordinarily creative enterprise on the part of the mediator and participating lawyers and
parties. While the degree of creativity required in mediation extends
beyond the scope of this article, a primary point of my discussion thus
See supra text accompanying notes 97-110.
161 As Winslade and Monk put it from the perspective of mediators conceptualizing
mediation, "we can think of the talk we create in mediation as actually constructing experience." WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 20, at 39.
160
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far - the importance of reconceptualizing disputes in terms of both the
Story of Mediation and the Story of Litigation - constitutes no mean
feat of intellectual legerdemain. The adoption of the vocabulary of
mediation, therefore, represents a challenge for both lawyer and client
that when identified explicitly as such can make it all the more appealing to the client.
E.

Considering the Opposite

I have already alluded to how an accepted mediation technique is
to encourage parties to consider the other side's perspective.l 62 Some
mediators do this by assigning written "homework" through which
one party generates a list of items that would "support" the other
side's perspective,]63 or by "asking each party to restate the opposing
view before they put forth their response, position, or statement."]64
This technique builds upon a rich social science literature that has
validated a process called "considering the opposite" or "counterexplanation."]65 The basic idea underlying this strategy is that humans
assimilate information in line with what they already believe - a tendency social psychologists call "confirmation bias."166 In the context
of disputes, this means that a party will likely assimilate information
relating to the dispute in a way that is consistent with that party's position, or, to adopt the perspective of narrative theory, a party will interpret information in a way that is consistent with that party's story.
Information that is plainly incongruent and thus cannot be assimilated
into the "true" story of "what happened" tends to be dismissed as
distorted, false or irrelevant. Considering the opposite combats this
tendency by encouraging an active consideration of opposite perspectives by constructing justifications for that perspective. The key here
is that the consideration must be active: merely "listening" - even in
good faith - to another side does not work because information will
]62 See supra text accompanying notes 76-8l.
163 Elisa T. Deener, A Mediation Tale: A Reading from the Contextual Legal Criticism
Perspective (unpublished article) (on file with author).
164 KOVACH, supra note 63, at 140.
165 See, e.g., Charles G. Lord, Mrak R. Lepper, & Elizabeth Preston, Considering the
Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1231 (1984); Edward R. Hirt & Keith D. Markman, Multiple Explanation: A Consider the
Alternative Strategy for Debiasing Judgments, 69 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1069
(1995); Craig A. Anderson & Elizabeth S. Sechler, Effects of Counterexplanation on the
Development and Use of Social Theories, 50 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 24 (1986);
Asher Koriat et aI., Reasons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 107 (1980). For a general discussion description of this technique in another context, see Rubinson, supra note 36, at 32-34.
166 Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal
History, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 603, 606 (1980).
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still either be assimilated into the "true story" or discarded if this is
not possible. Exhortations to be "as objective and unbiased as possible" do not work for the same reason. 167
Given that "considering the opposite" tends to achieve greater
openness to alternative perspectives, lawyers might consider a similar
"homework assignment" for clients. While at first blush this might
seem preposterous or paternalistic, it is accepted practice - indeed, it
is often good lawyering - for lawyers to ask clients to find documents,
witnesses, or perform other tasks related to representation or to undertake mock cross-examinations to prepare a witness. 168 The process
of considering the opposite might well produce an intuitive understanding of the constructed nature of disputes by highlighting an alternative narrative of a dispute.
Needless to say, this is the riskiest, most dangerous tool in the kit,
albeit one with perhaps the greatest potential of all. It might be well
to only employ this after using other tools first, and only with clients
lawyers predict will be receptive to it. In any event, it would be preposterous to simply suggest this to a client without an explanation.
Clients might well suspect that an attorney is being disloyal, or not
fully fighting for the transparent justice of the client's cause.1 69 Nevertheless, it seems to me perfectly acceptable to openly disclose to the
client the purpose of the exercise and the legal and psychological basis
for it, and to propose - albeit with discretion and a sense of how well
it might be received - that it might generate for the lawyer and client
creative and potentially effective means to manage the client's
conflict.
CONCLUSION

Disputes are extraordinarily complex events whose stories can be
told and retold in a multitude of ways. In the past, lawyers have embraced this idea within the context of litigation. With the rise of mediation, however, the norms of litigation and the stories these norms
generate are no longer the only ones in play. To the contrary, it is now
clear that the nature of a dispute - what a dispute fundamentally is is contingent upon how lawyers describe alternative modes of dispute
resolution to clients and which mode or modes lawyers and clients
ultimately choose to employ.
Mediation therefore is far more than an "alternative" to litigaSee, e.g., Lord et aI., supra note 165, at 1233-37.
See, e.g., THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 51 (6th ed. 2002)
Of course, such complications are inherent whenever attorneys - as they often must
- seek to deflate client expectations or explore inconsistencies about a case. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 46, at 320-321; BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 137, at 273-282.
167
168
169
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tion: it is a new way of telling stories about the world. These new
stories are worth telling or at least exploring, and lawyers who meet
the challenges of doing so enrich and expand the means through
which both lawyers and clients resolve disputes.

